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PREFACE
The present report will attempt to set forth the
background for the thinking of st. Thomas Aquinas on economic problems.

The emphasis is on the basic principles of

Thomistic ethics rather than on the solution to special
problems of economics.

Consequently, the task has been one

ot exclusion.
A certain amount of contrast between the present outlook
on economics and that of st. Thomas has been included.
In the historical and economic background the writer
is indebted to the criticisms and suggestions of Professor
Frank A. Fetter of Princeton.

Acknowledgement is also made

to Dr. Joseph Le Blanc of Loyola for suggestions and
references to valuable source material.

A very special

acknowledgement is made to Father John McCormick, s. J. for
his careful criticisms and his inspiration throughout the
preparation of the thesis.
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INTRODUCTION
Economics, as it is generally understood to-day, is
considered a social science and it is treated as a distinct
branch of learning.

We must remember, however, that such has

been the case for only a comparatively short time.

Adam

Smith was probably the first to put economics in a separate
category and label it as an independent science.

Unfortun-

ately it is from him that much ot present day economic
thinking takes its form.

Strange as it may seem, Smith

himself was a moral philosopher, but by directing most ot
his attention to the economic activities ot man and by
departing from the philosophical approach he came to be
known as the "Father of Modern Economics."

Thus, from 1776,

the date of the publication of Smith's greatest work (1),
economics has been treated as a distinct branch of learning.
Prior to that time a study of the economic activity of
man had not been neglected. (2)

On the contrary we find

that economic problems peculiar to each period had been
given careful consideration.

However, since economic act-

ivities were recognized as human acts - they were treated as
parts of ethics, they were problems considered by the
philosophers.

Thus it was that st. Thomas Aquinas, who was

interested in all reality, gave consideration to what we
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would call to-day the field of economics.

The problems of

that day differed from the problems we have at the present
in that they were less complex.

Likewise, they were not as

important tor then economic welfare was not considered the
primary interest of human beings.

But, the principles which

st. Thomas applied to the problems of the thirteenth century
are worthy of consideration at any time or any period.
The present investigation will attempt to set forth a
prolegomena to the economics of st. Thomas.

By this is

meant the background or the basis of the economic thinking of
St. Thomas.

To him economic activity came within the

category of human acts.

Therefore, it is necessary to

understand his general treatment of human acts before
considering any special kind of human acts.

This study will

attempt to set forth, as the prolegomena to the economics of
st. Thomas 1) the nature of man and his place in the
universe; 2) man as a social being; 3) the internal principles
of man's actions; and 4) the application of these general
principles to some specific economic problems by st. Thomas.
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CHAPTER I
The Nature of Man and His Place
in the Order of
the Universe
In order to understand the economics of st. Thomas it
is necessary to recognize the place it occupies in the
Thomistic synthesis.

It cannot be considered as a distinct

and separate branch of learning.

At the outset of the Summa

Theolosica, st. Thomas indicates the scope of his work and
the relationship of the topics treated:
"The main purpose of this sacred science is to
make us acquainted with God, as He is in Himself and as the source and goal of things, and
in a special way of man. We mean to give an
analysis of this problem, and shall first treat
of God, secondly of the movement of man toward
God, and thirdly of Christ, who, as man, is
our way to God." (3)
Thus we see that st. Thomas did not confine himself merely
to a consideration of God but considered at length man•s
relation to God and man's relation to man.
From this consideration it is evident why st. Thomas
did not treat economics as a separate science.

Neither would

he treat politics separately, that is, as independent of
ethics.

Rather, he treated all human acts under ethics for

there he considered how man should conduct himself in his
movement toward God.

Thus all human acts: social, political,

and economic were a part of the ethics of st. Thomas.
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Because of this it is necessary for us to look to the general
nature of the ethics of st. Thomas.

It is on the basis of

the principles set forth that he considered any economic
problem.
If ethics treats of man•s movement toward God our first
point of enquiry must be in regard to the nature of man.
Man is something different !rom everything else in the
universe for he is a union of a spiritual and a material
entity created by God.

According to the principle of order

first things must be placed first.

Therefore, the spiritual

side of man is of primary importance - everything must be
subject to it.

However, even though the spirit is of primary

importance it is extrinsically dependent on matter in its
existence in man.

For this reason st. Thomas considers

material things at some length.

Were it not for this extrin-

sic dependence on matter he would have been Justified in
excluding all such considerations.

But, since man is, at

least in a sense, dependent on matter, material things must
be considered.

Among these considerations we find the

topics relating to economics.

However, as we proceed in

this study we shall see how st. Thomas' notion of the primacy
of the spiritual side is kept before us in all considerations.
A second characteristic of man that must be set forth
is that he is a self directing being. (4)

He is the
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principle of his actions and has free choice and dominion
over them. (5)

In the ethics of st. Thomas we find a

consideration of how man chooses in his movements on his way
to his end. (6)

It is assumed in this study, though it may

be shown clearly in the metaphysics of st. Thomas, that
there must be a cause of all movement.

Now that cause is

· called an end, and, as is shown below (7) the end is the
rule of everything that is ordained to the end.
movement is toward some end.

Thus all

'However, the movement of man

differs and the end of man differs from other things.

The

movement ot the world and of all nature is guided by God
toward its perfection. (8)

But, as has been aaid above,

man has a freedom of choice in his movements, and, due to
his nature which is spiritual, his end must be different from
the end of any material or directed being.

Our next point

of enquiry, then, will concern itself with a determination
of man's end.

However, before looking to what constitutes

the end of man one point must be made clear.

That point is

that man does not necessarily have freedom of choice in
regard to all acts.

Certain acts are common to all animals.

But, man, in virtue of his spirituality, has the power of
reasoning and willing.

It is only over the acts which man

performs as man, or those resulting from reason and will,
that we may say man has freedom of choice.

With regard to
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these acts then, man must choose in such a way that he may
arrive at his final or ultimate end. (9)

.

In treating this matter st. Thomas says:
11 We shall consider first the last end of human
life; and secondly, those things by means of
which man may advance toward this end, or stray
from the path: for the end is the rule of whatever is ordained to the end. And since the last
end of human life is stated to be happiness, we
consider 1) the last end in general 2) happiness."

(10)

If man in his human acts, acts reasonably, the question
arises - as was stated above - as to what end the acts are
directed.
ends.

Obviously there are many different accidental

However, it is clear from St. Thomas• reasoning that:
"absolutely speaking, it is not possible to
proceed indefinitely in the matter of ends, from
any point of view." (11)

But just as there is said to be a first cause there must
also be an ultimate end.

He continues to point out that it

is impossible to go on to infinity in ends,
"since if there were no last end, nothing would
be desired nor would any action have its term,
nor would the attention of the agent be at rest;
while if there is no first thing among those
that are ordained to the end, none would begin
to work at anything and counsel would have no
term, but would continue indefinitely." (12)
Of course, just as there may be indeterminate accidental
causes there may be an infinity of accidental ends.

This is

beside the point when considering the ultimate end.
If it is true that man always acts for an end and an
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ultimate end the question presents itself as to whether or
not there may be several last ends.

st. Thomas answers in

the negative for three reasons:
"First, because since everything desires its own
perfection a man desires for his ultimate end,
that which he desires for his perfect and crowning
good ••••• It is therefore necessary for the last
end so to fill man's appetite that nothing is left
beside it for man to desire." (13)
Obviously then, the appetite cannot tend to two things as a
perfect good.

Secondly,

"just as in the process of reasoning, the principle
is that which is naturally known, so in the process
of the rational appetite ••••• the principle needs
to be that which is naturally desired. Now this
must needs be one: since nature tends to one thing
only. But the principle in the process of the
rational appetite is the last end. Therefore, that
to which the will tends, as to its last end, is
one. 11 (14)
And lastly,
••s iuce voluntary actions receive their species from
the end ••••• they must needs receive their genus
from the last end which is common to them all: just
as natural things are placed in a genus according
to a common form. Since, then, all things that can
be desired by the will, belong, as such, to one
genus, the last end must needs be one." (15)
Everything that man wills, he wills for the last end,
and that last end we call happiness.

The last end, or happi-

ness, must be something that fulfills the perfection of man.(l6)
Having come to this conclusion we must next turn to the
question of what constitutes happiness.

Unless it is clear

where man is going and what he must accomplish in life it is
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useless to consider the suitability of possible ways of
acting.

Therefore, it is impossible to discuss economic

problems without having clearly outlined man's objective,
his goal, his ultimate end.
There are many apparent goods which some may set up as
the last end of man - as that which will give happiness.
Probably one of the most frequently mentioned by practical
man is wealth.

But St. Thomas in company with the other

philosophers, says that man's happiness cannot consist in
wealth.

His discussion points out that there are two kinds

of wealth - natural, or that which man uses in satisfying his
natural wants {food and clothing and the like) ; and artificial, or that which man uses for convenience in exchange
{money).
"Now it is evident that man's happiness cannot
consist in natural wealth. For wealth of this
kind is sought for the sake of something else
••••• consequently it cannot be man's last end,
rather it is ordained to man as to its end •••••
And as to artificial wealth, it is not sought
save for the sake of natural wealth, Consequently
much less can it be considered in the light of
the last end." {17)
Thus we see that happiness, that which man is striving for,
cannot be wealth.

Since economics is primarily concerned

with wealth it follows that in a philosophy of lite such as
that presented by st. Thomas the economic aspects of man's
activity are necessarily subordinate.

Hence economic

-11questions as such are slighted by him and are considered only
because of their connection with morality.
In considering other possibilities of things that might
bring happiness st. Thomas discusses, secondly, whether or
not honor may bring happiness.
by way of his excellence.

Now, honor comes to a man

But,

"a man's excellence is in proportion, especially,
to his happiness, which is man's perfect good ••••
and therefore honor can result from happiness,
but happiness cannot principally consist therein."
(18)

Again, neither fame nor glory can be happiness.

Since

glory consists in being favorably known and praised, it is
dependent on human knowledge.

But,

tthappiness cannot be caused by human knowledge:
but rather human knowledge of another's happiness
proceeds from, and in a fashion, is caused by
human happiness itself, inchoate or perfect." (19)
Still others put forth the opinion that happiness consists in power.

Again st. Thomas shows this to be impossible

due to the very nature of happiness as the perfect good.

He

gives two specific reasons why happiness is not power:
"First because power has the nature of principle ••
whereas happiness has the nature of last end.
Secondly, because power has relation to good and
evil: whereas happiness is man's proper and
perfect good." (20)
It is evident, then, that happiness does not consist in
any of the tour external goods mentioned above for the
specific reasons stated.

st. Thomas also points out tour

-12general reasons why these and similar things cannot mean
happiness.
"First, because since happiness is man's supreme
good, it is incompatible with any evil. Now all
the foregoing can be found both in good and in
evil men.--secondly, because, since it is the
nature of happiness to satisfy of itself •••••
having gained happiness man cannot lack any
needful good. But after acquiring any of the
foregoing man may still lack many goods that are
necessary to him •••• " (21)
such material goods as health, and such important things as
wisdom are still lacking even if the man possesses these
external goods.
"Thirdly, because, since happiness is the perfect
good, no evil can accrue to anyone therefrom.
This cannot be said of the foregoing: for it is
written •••• that riches are sometimes kept to the
hurt of the owner; and the same may be said of
the other three. Fourthly, because man is
ordained to happiness through principles that
are in him; since he is ordained thereto naturally. Now the four goods mentioned above are
due rather to external causes, and in most cases
to fortune ••••• Therefore it is evident that
happiness nowise consists in the foregoing." (22)
so far in our discussion of the question of happiness
the treatment has been negative.

However, by implication

we have indicated something of the nature of true happiness
which is the end of man.

st. Thomas in his positive state-

ment on the subject says:
"Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing
else than the vision of the Divine Essence. To
make this clear two points must be observed. First,
that man is not perfectly happy, so long as some-
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thing remains for him to desire and seek: secondly
that the perfection of any power is determined by
the nature of its object." (23)
Now man•s intellect continually seeks its object which is the
essence of things.

The intellect attains perfection as it

knows the essence of things.

When man knows only the effect

of some cause that is not sufficient to satisfy the
intellect for it has a desire to know the cause also.
"Consequently, tor perfect happiness the intellect
needs to reach the very ESsence of the First
cause. And thus it will have its perfection
through union with God as with that object, in
which alone man's happiness consists." (24)
Therefore the final end of man and the goal toward which
all actions must be directed is union with God through the
vision of the Divine Essence.

I! this is the end of man and

if man has a freedom of choice in selecting means of attaining that end then man is responsible in selecting his means
for reaching that end.

For this reason man must consider

carefully the various means that he may choose.

All of the

activities, including economic activities, •hich man exercises
in pursuing his end--happiness--should be such as would fit
in with what we call the virtuous life.

This form ot life

alone is suitable for the attainment of this end.

In

Chapter III, the Virtuous life will be considered.
Today, when economic activity occupies such a place
of importance it is particularly important for man to recog-

-14nize why he chooses and what he must choose.

If it is

possible to keep before man his ultimate end the difficulty
of seeing the right choice is not so great.

Of course this

difficulty has always existed, - that is why St. Thomas
placed such emphasis on man•s ultimate end.

That is the

reason why such emphasis is placed on making clear st.
Thomas• conception of the ultimate end of man in this report.
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CHAPTER II
Man as a Social Being

It has been pointed out that in all nature there is an
end to be attained and that there are certain directive
principles helping guide each thing to its proper end.

In

the case of man, st. Thomas points out:
"The light of reason is placed by nature in
every man, to guide him in his acts towards
his end. Were man intended to live alone •••
he would require no other guide to his end.
Then would each man be a king unto himself,
under God ••••• inasmuch as he would direct
himself in his acts by the light of reason
given him from on high. However, it is natural for man to be a social and political
animal as the very needs of his nature
indicate." (25)
All living things have material needs but the needs of nonmaterial living beings are supplied by nature.

On the

contrary man has no natural provision for his needs.

Instead

he has been endowed with reason and with it he can direct
his physical labor to procure what he needs.

However, st.

Thomas points out:
"one man alone is not able to procure them all
for himself; for one man could not sufficiently
provide for life unassisted. It is therefore
natural that man should live in company with
his fellows." (26)
st. Thomas develops other reasons proving that man is by
nature social, 1. e., that man must have knowledge for human
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life but no one can have knowledge of all things necessary;
and that man, through speech, communicates more than any other
animal.

Thus we see that it is natural for man to be a social

and political animal - to live in a group - for the attainment of his temporal welfare. (27)
If man is to live in a group there must be some order,
some government, someone to look after the common good.
Otherwise the group would soon disintegrate or would not
accomplish its purpose.

st. Thomas uses the analogy of the

body, that unless there is a general regulating force the
parts would disintegrate and fail to serve the common good
of all. (28)

As a matter of fact in all nature where a com-

mon end is to be attained by a group there is something
that rules:
"Thus in the corporeal universe other bodies
are regulated, according to a certain order
of divine providence, by the first body,
namely the celestial body, and all bodies
are controlled by a rational creature. So,
too, in the individual man, the soul rules
the body; and among the parts of the soul, the
irascible and concupiscible parts are ruled by
the reason. Likewise among the members of a
body, one is the principal and moves all the
others, as the heart or the head. Therefore,
in every group there must be some governing
power." (29)
It is therefore natural for man to live in a group over
which there is government.

This group so governed consti-

tutes a perfect society,- a family, a city, a state.
importance of such society for the temporal welfare is

The
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evident from what has been said.

When st. Thomas observes

that "the end is prior in intention but posterior in execution
(30) he merely states in abstract terms our conclusion that
the family and state, as means to arrive at an end, must be
utilized before arriving at that end.

The purpose of society

is to attain the temporal welfare of all its members - to
provide for their economic, social, and political needs, to
protect them, and to aid them to the virtuous life.
constitute the end of society.

These

The governor of the society

must not forget that temporal welfare, though the end of
society, is a means in a finite world to permit men to attain
an ultimate spiritual end. (31) As the family and state look
after the temporal welfare of man - the society of God, the
Church, looks after the spiritual welfare of man.

Such

organizations, then, are taken for granted by St. Thomas as
a structure in which human acts take place.

It is within

these organizations that st. Thomas visualized economic
activity and it is within them that he proposed norms for
such activity.
St. Thomas laid down the general principles stated
above showing the importance of organization.

At the time

during which he lived there was another type of organization
which performed a part of the function that is performed by
the modern state, i. e., control of economic welfare.
organization was known as the guild.

The guild was far

That
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closer to the individual than the medieval state, and, as such,
was of the more immediate importance in control.

A study of

the history of the guilds shows an application of many of the
principles taught by st. Thomas.

In the first place they

were organized to promote the temporal welfare.

However, the

earlier guilds, at least, were very definitely spiritual in
point of view.

For example, one thing that the guilds .in-

sisted upon was the observance of feast days.
The control exercised by these societies was definitely
for the common good.

Their efforts tended to restrain

individuals who might try to place selfish ends ahead of the
general welfare.

Not only did the guilds attempt to limit

avarice and competition but they attempted to consider the
worker.

The master who held full membership intbe guilds

regulated the hours of labor and set up standards of training for young men interested in coming into their particular
field.

They tended to protect the consumer through the

regulation of prices and through setting up standards of
quality.

It may be observed that the notion of just price,

which will be discussed later, was one of the things the
guilds sought to establish.
Thus in the medieval period man, the social being, was
organized in the Church which looked after his spiritual
welfare, in the state and the guilds which looked after his
temporal welfare.

The history of Europe during this period
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and during following periods shows clearly the effect of the
social control that was exercised.

But during this period

it was something more than organizations that dominated.

The

people did not seek a purely economic rationality in their
activity.

The guilding norms of all activity were what we

might call to-day extra-economic.

These standards were

religious, moral, and secondarily, political.

They tended

to restrain both private and public activity.

In the last

analysis, the real limiting force was the spirit of the age
and the ideas and ideals of the people.

These exerted them-

selves through the organizations or societies: the church,
the state, and the guilds. (32)
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CHAPTER III
The Internal Principles of Action
After having discussed briefly the external organization
of society at the time St. Thomas lived and the importance
he attached to it, we may turn to the internal principles
of action which are the foundation and the principal part of
a normative approach to the social sciences.

We may refer to

the most important of these internal principles as the virtues.
st. Thomas discusses the meaning and nature of virtue at
length but for our purposes it is sufficient to note that by
virtue he means habit of the will of doing good acts, or a
habit of the will of forming a right disposition in the
lower faculties. (33)
the virtuous life.

Now it is the virtues which set up

The virtuous life, as was pointed out

at the end of Chapter I, is the life into which all of man•s
activities, including economic, must fit, if they are to be
suited to the attainment of the ultimate end.
The virtues are divided into the intellectual, the
moral and the theological.

Although all are of importance:

the intellectual if we are to understand the others, the
moral if we are to have right conduct, and the theological
if the others are to be perfect; it is the moral virtues
that we are primarily concerned with in this discussion.
Going further into the division of the virtues we find that
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st. Thomas designates four of the moral virtues as the
cardinal virtues.

He reminds us that:

"We can number things by beginning with their
formal principles or with their subjects; and in
either way we·find four cardinal virtues ••••••••
For there are four subjects of the virtue of
which we are now speaking: first, reason taken
in itself, which prudence perfects; then, 1hat
which only shares reason, and this in its turn
is subdivided into three kinds: the will which
is the subject of justice, emotions •••• which
form the subject of temperance, and (those)
which form the subject of fortitude." (34)
Thus we may speak of the four cardinal virtues as prudence,
justice, temperance and fortitude.

All other moral virtues

tend to revolve about or grow out of these four.
The virtues are said to be the principles of a good
life.

And, in his consideration of economic problems, St.

Thomas was concerned with how the good man would meet these
problems.

The good man, then, may be said to be one who

leads a virtuous life, one who possesses the intellectual,
the moral, and the theological virtues.

The virtues of the

natural order (the intellectual and moral) are so closely
interrelated that man must possess them all, at least
virtually.

Of course, the theological virtues are of the

supernatural order and are infused by God.

Hence, we may

say that there is a hierarchy of virtues.
Presupposing the lowest of the three virtues the Intellectual, and the first of the moral virtues - that which
perfects the intellectual - prudence, we may turn our
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attention to justice which may be said to be superior to all
other virtues relating to the will for it is the most rational.

St. Thomas points out that:

"People, strictly speaking, regard as the most
excellent, that virtue in which the good of
reason is the most resplendent; and in this
sense justice excels all other moral virtues,
as nearest to reason in both its subject and
object." (35)
This is true, he further points out, because the subject of
justice is the will and the will is the rational appetite.
Again, the object has to do not only with man himself but
with the operations which are involved in his conduct toward
other men.

Turning to a more detailed consideration of

justice we find st. Thomas defining it as:
"a habit whereby man renders to each one his due
by a constant and perpetual will." (36)
Emphasis is immediately placed on the notion of perpetual
for, it is a necessary condition of justice that man wills
to be just always.
"For it does not satisfy the conditions of
justice that one wish to observe justice in
some particular matter for the time being, because one could scarcely find a man willing to
act unjustly in every case; and it is requisite
that one should have the will to observe justice at all times and in all cases." (37)
Thus we cannot say that man is practising justice if he is
just only part of the time.
The definition of justice given by St. Thomas indicates
that justice is always toward another.

Since
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"justice by its name implies equality, it denotes
essentially relation to another, for a thing is
equal not to itself but to another." (38)
And,

ES

we shall show, the rendering to every man his due must

necessarily imply a form of equality.
strictly speaking.

This is justice

It is also possible to use the word

justice metaphorically when each part of man is ordered
according to what is becoming to it.
st. Thomas makes it clear that justice does not mean
merely knowing what is right.

Justice is not aimed at rec-

tifying the intellect or a cognitive faculty.

But,

"since we are said to be just through doing something aright, and because the proximate principle
of action is the appetitive power, justice must
needs be in some appetitive power as its subject." (39)
Obviously justice cannot be in the sensitive appetite so it
must be in the will.

Thus,

fB

was said above, justice is a

moral virtue rather than an intellectual virtue.
Having seen something of the nature of justice we may
proceed to consider in some detail the divisions of justice.
The most obvious division is into general and particular
our first point of enquiry is whether justice is general
virtue.

st. Thomas answers this question in the affirmative.

In~riving at this answer st. Thomas reasons that, in the

first place justice directs the actions of man with other
men.

Now such activity may be of two kinds.

It may pertain

to individuals or it may pertain to others in general.
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Justice can direct man's actions in both respects.

Con-

tinuing the argument st. Thomas writes:
"It is evident that all who are included in a community
stand in relation to that community as parts to
a whole; while a part, as such, belongs to a
whole, so that whatever is the good of a part
can be directed to the good of the whole. It
follows therefore that the good of any virtue,
whether such virtue directs man in relation to
himself, or in relation to certain other individual persons, is referable to the common good,
to which justice directs: so that all acts of
virtue can pertain to justice, insofar as it
directs man to the common good." ( 40)
It is the purpose of law to direct to the common good.

Thus

the justice referred to above in the sense of a general
virtue
"is called legal justice, because thereby man is
in harmony with the law which directs the acts of
all the virtues to thecommongood." (41)
Obviously, then, we can say that justice is a general virtue,
and in this sense we may refer to justice as legal justice.
At later times st. Thomas seems to speak of legal justice
as being a species of general justice but is probable that
this use of the word legal is in a different and more particular sense.
General or legal justice is in a sense the same as all
virtue, but in another sense it differs from all virtue.
This may be made clear in the following passage:
"the name of legal justice can be given to every
virtue, insofar as every virtue is directed to
the common good by the aforesaid legal justice,
which though special essentially is nevertheless

-25virtually generally general. Speaking in this way,
legal justice is essentially the same as all virtue,
but it differs therefrom logically." (42)
The second division of justice is that of particular
justice.

That there is need for such a division of justice is

stated by St. Thomas:
" •• besides legal justice which directs man immediately to the common good, there is need for other
virtues to direct him immediately in matters
relating to particular goods: and these virtues
may be relative to himself or to another individual
person. Accordingly, just as in addition to legal
justice there is a need for particular virtues to
direct man in relation to himself, such as temperance and fortitude, so too besides legal justice
there is a need for particular justice to direct
man in his relations to other individuals." (43)
The matter of justice is, strictly speaking, not internal
operations or passions but external operations. Measuring
justice, then differs from measuring other virtues.

While

this will be treated in more detail later when another
division of justice is considered, we may complete our
present discussion by referring again to the Summa !heologica
where St. Thomas declares that:
"the mean of justice consists in a certain
proportion of equality between the external
thing and the external person. Now equality
is the real mean between greater and less •••
wherefore justice observes the real mean."(44)
Therefore when we say that justice has as its proper act
rendering to every one his own we mean rendering to each man
what is his due according to the equality of proportion.
Thus we conclude our general discussion of justice
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calling attention to the repeated statement that justice is
the foremost among the moral virtues.

st. Thomas quotes

freely the earlier philosophers holding this view:
"Tully says (De Offic. i. 7):Justice is the most
resplendent of the virtues, and gives its name
to a good man." (45)
He also quotes Aristotle on the same point who
"declares (Ethic, v. i) that the most excellent
of the virtues would seem to be justice, and
more glorious than either the evening or the
morning star." (46)
st. Thomas himself concludes:
"If we speak of legal justice, it is evident
that it stands foremost among all the moral
virtues, for as much as the common good transcends the individual good of one person." (47)
If we are to have a complete understanding of what st.
Thomas meant by justice we must turn our attention to his
discussion of the species of justice.

He considers that there

are two species of justice, distributive and commutative.
Now particular justice, as spoken of above relates to the
private individual.

The individual may have external acts

in regard to other individuals and in regard to the community
as a whole.

The order of the first:

"is directed by commutative justice which is
concerned about the mutual dealings between two
persons. In the second place there is the
order of the whole towards the parts, to which
corresponds the order of that which belongs to
the community in relation to each single person.
This order is directed by distributive justice,
which distributes common goods proportionately."
(48)
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The question now arises of measuring justice when it is
considered according to species.

In regard to distributive

justice
"something is given to a private individual, insofar as what belongs to the whole is due to a
part, and in a quantity that is proportionate to
the importance of the position of that part in
respect to the whole." (49)
Under distributive justice then the more important the person
is the greater share he receives of the common goods.

Thus:

"in distributive justice the mean is observed,
not according to equality between thing and thing,
but according to proportion between things and
persons ••• Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v •.
3,4) that the mean in the latter case follows
geometric proportion, wherein equality depends
not on quantity but on proportion." (50)
On the other hand, in commutative justice there is a different
situation.

Here we have a condition where there is an ex-

change of thing and thing.

For example in buying and selling

a person may barter one thing for another or one thing for
money.

In such a case

"it is necessary to equalize thing with thing,
so that one person should pay back to the other
just so much as he has become richer out of
·
that which belonged to the other. The result of
this will be equality according to the arithmetical mean which is gauged according to the
equal excess in quantity." (51)
Thus justice may be seen to apply equality under two aspects
both of which have a very definite bearing on the economic
activity of men.

Distributive justice has a bearing on all

matters of organization and on some phases of distribution
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such as wages.

Commutative justice should play a part in the

whole field of exchange - value and price.
If we are to have before us the complete picture of the
virtuous life which was the basis of economic activity we
must go beyond the field of the philosopher and round out
our picture by bringing into it the theological virtue charity.

It is true that it is possible to discuss the moral

life strictly speaking without reference to the theological
virtues but it must be remembered that the theological
virtues are the conditions for the complete moral life.

Since

our discuasion is more concerned with the exposition of the
complete moral life in the economic world there is adequate
justification for borrowing from the field of theology and
turning our attention to that virtue which is said to keep
all others in place - charity.
The definition of charity that we find in st. Thomas
is that "charity is the friendship of man for God." (52)
Charity, then is something more than love for not all love
passes the quality of friendship.
must be benevolence.
kind of communication.

In addition to love there

More than that, there must be some
Since

"there is. a communication between man and God,
inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to
us, some kind of friendship must needs be based
on this same communication ••••• the love which
is based on this communication, is charity."(53)
From this we may draw an understanding of the extent of
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friendship.

In the first place friendship extends to one's

friends.

Secondly, it extends to someone in respect to

another.

In fact:

"so much do we love our friends that for their
sake we love all who belong to them, even if
they hurt or hate us; so that, in this way, the
friendship of charity extends even to our
enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation
to God, to Whom the friendship of charity is
chiefly directed." (54)
From our point of view it is not necessary to outline
the proofs showing that charity is supernatural, some added
form inclining the soul to the act of charity; that charity
is a virtue which is special and yet is not divided into
species but is one.

These may be assumed but some consider-

ation should be given to the question of the excellence of
the virtue of charity.

Now since the object of the

theological virtues is God, it is evident that they are more
excellent than the intellectual and moral virtues.

If we

are to designate any one of the theological virtues as the
most excellent it will be the one that which attains God
most. And:
"that which is of itself always ranks before that
which is of another. But faith and hope attain
God indeed insofar as we derive from Him the
knowledge of truth or the acquisition of good,
whereas charity attains God Himself that it may
rest in Him, but not that something may accrue
to us from Him~ Hence charity is more excellent
than faith or hope, and, consequently, than all
tbe other virtues." (55)
It has already been stated above that friendship, which
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is the basis of charity, extends to all that belongs to a
friend.

We may now come more specifically to the extension

of charity to our neighhor.

"The aspect under which our

neighbor is to be loved is God,
"since what we ought to love in our neighbor is
that he may be in God. Hence it is clear that
it is specifically the same act whereby we love
God, and whereby we love our neighbor. Consequently the habit of charity extends not only
to the love of God, but also the love of our
neighbor." (56)
The complete extension of charity may be summarized under the
four headings of God, our neighbors, our bodies and ourselves.
Should we wish to take charity in a metaphorical sense we
may include in its extension everything that canm used for
God's honor and for the good of man.
From this general consideration of charity we may pass
to the order of charity and begin our discussion by determining whether or not there is order in charity.

Order

means that some things are to be placed before others and
that things have a proper place.
"Hence wherever there is a principle, there must
needs be order of some kind. But ••••• the love of
charity tends to God as to the principle of happiness, on the fellowship ~f which the friendship
of charity is based. Consequently there must
needs be some order in things loved out of charity,
which order is in reference to the principle of
that love, which is God." (57)
In the order of charity the first relationship which
presents itself to us is the relation of our love of God to
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our love for a neighbor.

Now,

"Each kind of friendship regards chiefly the object
in which we chiefly find the good on the fellowship
of which the friendship is based ••• the friendship
of charity is based on the fellowship of happiness,
which consists essentially in God, as the First
Principle, whence it flows to all who are capable
of happiness." (58)
Thus we ought to love God chiefly and directly because He is
the cause of our nappiness.

On the other hand our neighbors

are to be loved in a dervided sense as sharing with us the
happiness from God.

Continuing to place things in their

proper places as sharing in charity, st. Thomas would place
the love of God before the love of neighbor.

Finer grading

continues placing different kinds of neighbors and relatives
in their proper places.
Charity must play a leading role in the moral order
discussed by St. Thomas.

The charity which perfected the

life of virtue established a fellowship and friendship among
men which made an ordered economy possible.

Therefore, it

was not a difficult thing to enforce a just price and similar
customs of the thirteenthmntury.
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CHAPTER IV
Some Specific Economic
Problems
Treated by St. Thomas

Man living a virtuous life in

an~fort

to attain his

final end, and living in a perfect society - a state - where
the concern of those governing is the common good, will have
to carry on activities in order to earn a livelihood.

If

man leads the virtuous life, if the government is good he
will apply the general principles already discussed.

This

was the view St. Thomas took of economics and so anything
that we might call Thomistic economics would deal largely
with applying these general principles to whatever type of
economic activity that might arise.
From what has already been said it is evident that st.
Thomas was not positivistic in his approach to economics.
His approach was definitely normative for he was concerned
primarily with the oughtness of the acts.

The ordinary

approach of the economist to-day is exactly the opposite of
that of st. Thomas.

To-day the approach is usually positiv-

istic, frequently it may be institutional, but it is never
normative.

As a matter of fact nearly every writer on the

subject begins his work with the statement that he is not
interested in the oughtness of the field of economics but is
concerned only with what is. (59) A few moments reflection
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it clear why modern economists are not concerned with

m~{eS

the oughtness of acts.

For them the end of economic activity

is the satisfaction of the material wants of man.

They see

nothing beyond that and have no apparent concern with the
ultimate end of man which st. Thomas kept constantly before
him in the consideration of every problem.

Thus for St.

Thomas the primary thing, in fact the only thing he was
interested in, was the oughtness of the act, or how it would
aid or hinder man in attaining his last end.
In order to give a specific notion of how st. Thomas
approached economic problems we may choose several topics for
illustration.

It must be remembered that since economics

was not the primary concern of man in the thirteenth century
st. Thomas did not deal at length with many problems such as
we have to-day.

However, he did discuss those problems which

were of importance at the time.

Economics had not been

divided into the categories of study that it is to-day, i.e.,
production exchange, and distribution.

Consequently he did

not make a scientific treatment of the different topics.

We

find practically no mention of production in the modern
sense.

The reason is obvious:

ness in production at the time.
find

there was no problem of oughtRegarding exchange we do

St. Thomas treating the 'subject.

Exchange must be a

problem whenever men have moved from the most primitive
stage of economic development.

This problem is treated
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under the subject of the just price or fair rate of exchange.
Here we find the first indication of the Thomistic method of
considering the problems in the light of the general principles
wh1ch had already been considered as necessary for man in
attaining his last end.
The modern notion of value is that the rate of exchange
is entirely a phenomenon of the market; that it is determined
by the interaction of the two sets of forces known as supply
and demand; that it is something objective and entirely removed from ethics.

On the contrary st. Thomas points out that

all such activity must serve the common good:
"Buying and selling seems to be established for
the common advantage of both parties, one of
whom requires that which belongs to the other
and vice versa ••• " (60)
Regarding the actual aanner of carrying on exchange he points
out:
"whatever is established for the common advantage,
should not be more of a burden to one party than
to another, and consequently all contracts between them should observe the equality of thing
and thing. Again the quality of a thing that
comes into human use is measured by the price given
for it, for which purpose money was invented ••••
therefore, if either the price exceed the quantity
of the things worth, or, conversely, the thing exceed the price, there is no longer the quality of
justice; and consequently to sell a thing for more
than it is worth, or to buy it for less than it is
worth is unjust and unlawful. 11 (61)
In this treatment we see that St. Thomas was concerned solely
with whether or not the transaction was just.

He applies the
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principles of justice in his solution to the problem of exchange and pays no attention to the accidental methods and
forces that affect exchange.

In the above passage it is a

bit difficult to determine exactly what St. Thomas means by
the word "worth."

The probable meaning is that a certain

worth is intrinsic in each good.

This intrinsic worth would

depend on the suitableness of the good for man.

While it is

entirely possible that this is what St. Thomas had in mind
we must not overlook the difficulty of determining the suitableness for different people, since most of these goods are
only accidental to the livelihood of the people.

About the

only way in which this intrinsic worth can be judged is by
the common estimate.

Thus there seems to be both intrinsic

worth or suitableness, and the common estimate of that worth.
The former is something that is entirely foreign to modern
economic thinking.

However, the latter bears a rather close

resemblance to the modern notion of a social value scale
which grows out of the concept of utility.
Exchanges for the common advantage of each party are not
the only ones which take place.

There may be an exchange

which accidentally tends to the advantage of one party and to
the disadvantage of the other:
"for example, when a man has great need of a certain
thing while another man will suffer if he be without
it. In such a case the just price will depend not
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sale brings on the seller. And thus it will be
lawful to sell a thing for more than it is worth
in itself, though the price be not more than it
is worth to the owner. Yet if the one man derive
a great advantage by becoming possessed of the
other man's property, and the seller be not at a
loss through being without that thing, the latter
ought not to raise the price, because of the
advantage accruing to the buyer. Now no man
should sell what is not his, though he may charge
for the loss he suffers." (62)
Another case in which the buyer pays the seller the ordinary
price but derives special gain from the transaction presents
itself.

This is the case in which the buyer received what we

call in current economic terminology a "consumer"s surplus".
Regarding this st. Thomas says:
the buyer may pay the seller something over the
above: and this pertains to his honesty." (63)
11

In this conclusion we must notice how st. Thomas goes beyond
strict justice.

Though he says that tha payment mentioned

pertains to the honesty of the buyer it must really depend
on his charity or his love for his fellow-man.

In this one

article, then, we see how st. Thomas applies both justice and
charity to a problem that arose in economic activity.

It is

interesting to contrast with this the current notion of
business men.

The common practise to-day is ·to sell for as

much as one possibly can and to buy for as little as one
possibly can.

In this contrast we find what a vast difference

results from the seeking of different ends.

st. Thomas looked
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to the ultimate end toward which all activity must be directed,
while the modern business man looks only to an end that he
calls business success.
St. Thomas is not content with applying the principles
of justice and charity just to the actual exchange.
attempts to apply them to the goods exchanged.

He

In beginning

his discussion of faults that may be in the good that is sold
he quotes Ambrose who says {De Offic. iii. II):
"It is manifestly a rule of justice that a good
man should not depart from the truth, nor inflict
an unjust injury on anyone, nor have any connection
with fraud." {64)
He then proceeds to show how certain defects in the thing
sold are really fraudulent.

He mentions three defects: first,

in the substance; second, in the quantity; and third, in the
quality.
ceals

~

If any of these defects exist and the seller conthe transaction is said to be fraudulent and the

seller is bound to make restitution.

And, the same holds true

of the buyer, St. Thomas insists. {65)
Trading, in general, was looked down upon by st. Thomas
as it was by most of the philosophers.

The reason for this

was that they saw greed inseparably connected with trade.
Therefore it was not trade itself that they objected to, but
rather the greed that went with it.

St. Thomas will admit

that if trade is carried on legitimately as a means of attaining man•s last end, it is permissable.

In short, if gain is

incidental to the transaction and not the motive of the
transaction, it is permissible.

As a matter of fact he holds

that even gain may accrue to the trader if that gain is the
result of his labor or some service he has performed. (66)
This concludes the consideration St. Thomas gave to the
subject of exchange.

His approach is clear from the discus-

sion that has been presented.

He looked upon buying and

selling as something that might be necessary to enable man
to attain the means of reaching his end.

However, these means

must be directed toward the end and in his actions man must
be good, he must lead the virtuous life, his activities in
the field must show the effect of justice and charity.
Another illustration of st. Thomas' treatment of economic
subjects may serve to make clearer how he applied general
principles to these problems.

Probably a problem which holds

much present day interest is the problem of usury.

Usury has

been discussed by those who treated of economic topics since
Aristotle.

It is to be expected then that st. Thomas would

give it consideration.

Usury is the charge that was made

for the lending of money and was the forerunner of our modern
idea of interest, - though we must be careful not to contuse
the terms.

In his opening consideration of the problem St.

Thomas says:
"to take usury for money lent is unjust in itself
because this is to sell what does not exist, and
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evidently leads to inequality which is contrary
to justice." (67)
Here again there is the specific reference to justice; anything that violates justice is considered wrong.
st. Thomas continues his discussion of the sin of usury
by pointing out why it is wrong.

He tells us that there are

certain things the use of which consists in their consumption.
When dealing with such things the use cannot be separated
from the thing and if anyone is granted the use ot the thing
he must be granted the thing itself.
wheat and wine.

Examples cited are

One cannot sell wine separate from the use

of wine.
"In like manner he commits an injustice who lends
wipe or wheat, and asks for double payment, viz.,
one, the return of the thing in equal measure, the
other, the price of the use, which is called
usury." (68)
Applying this specifically to money, st. ThGmas refers to
Aristotle (Ethics v. 5 and Politics i. 3) and points out
that:
''money was invented chiefly for the purpose of
exchange: and consequently the proper and principal use of money is its consumption or
alienation whereby it is sunk in exchange. Hence
it is by its very nature unlawful to take payment
tor the use of money lent, which payment is known
as usury." ( 69)
Payment for the use of money, then, was considered wrong and
was forbidden.

However, under certain conditions compensation

for something that appears to be similar was permitted.

The
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following passage shows this point:
"A lender may without sin enter an agreement
with the borrower for compensation for the loss
he incurs of something he ought to have, for
this is not to sell the use of money but to
avoid a loss." (70)
Again:
" ••• he that entrusts his money to a merchant
or craftsman so as to form a kind of society,
does not transfer the ownership of his money
to them, for it remains his, so that at his
risk the merchants speculate with it, or the
craftsman uses it for his craft, and consequently he may lawfully demand as something
belonging to him, part or the profits derived
from the money." (71)
While the whole treatment of usury emphasizes again, as
would the treatment of any problem in economics by st.
Thomas, the principles of his ethics, it also illustrates
clearly how circumstances alter the conclusions.

The second

case mentioned above is considered lawful for under the
conditions there is nothing contrary to either justice or
charity.

But in the former case (69) where there was in-

equality, taking payment for the use of money lent, the
action was condemned.

Without attempting to contrast this

with the modern view of interest we may conclude that the
primary point made is that man in his borrowing and lending,
as in his buying, and in all his acts, ought to practise the
virtues so that he may attain his end.
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In this report an effort has been made to set forth the
principles of the philosophy of st. Thomas Aquinas as it has
reference to the field or economics.
Since economic activity centers about man the first
consideration was given to the nature of man and his place in
the order of the universe.
Man, according to St. Thomas, is a union of a material
and a spiritual entity, having as an ultimate end perfect
happiness.

Man differs from all other living beings and from

all non-living beings in that he has freedom of choice in
selecting means by which he can arrive at his end.

In the

attainment of that end the spiritual side of man, since it is
the superior, must dominate and rule the inferior or matter.
However, in this life, the spiritual entity in man, even
though it is superior, is extrinsically dependent on matter.
Consequently there must be some concern over material things.
Because of this St. Thomas enquires into the problems of the
material welfare of man.

He recognizes that men, in general,

must live together not only to aid one another in attaining
their ultimate ends, but also to provide for their material
welfare.

Men living together in a social group form an

external organization which aids them to attain their end.
If man is to attain his end of perfect happiness all of
his activities must be suited to the attainment of that end
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A life in which all these activities are so suited is called
the virtuous life.
virtuous life.

It is the virtues which set up the

Therefore, consideration must be given to

the virtues which are said to be the principles of a good
life.

There are three kinds of virtues--intellectual, moral

and theological.

Since this report is limited to a discussion

of st. Thomas• philosophy as it applies to economics only the
kind or virtues which apply directly to economic activity
were considered in detail--Justice and charity.
is the habit of rendering to everyone his due.

Now justice
It directs

man's actions in respect to individuals and in respect to
others as a whole.

A more complete picture or the virtuous

life as the basis of economic activity must include a discussion of the Theological virtue of charity.
defined as man's friendship for God.

Charity is

This friendship must

mean a love of God, and by that a love of our neighbors.
Charity must perfect the life of virtue and establish a
friendship among men.

Obviously, if life is dominated by·

justice and charity, it is possible to have an ordered
economy.
Lastly, some specific economic problems were considered
in an effort to show the application of these principles.
The problems of exchange or price illustrates how the general
principles of st. Thomas' philosophy or life are applied.

To
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st. Thomas any human act must aid man in attaining his end.
The exchange of goods for economic welfare is a human act and
consequently must be directed toward man's last end.

The

virtue (the internal principle of action) which must govern
exchange directly is justice.
just price.

Thus St. Thomas discusses the

His sole concern is with the morality of the

~ct.

A second illustration was found in his treatment of
usury, which corresponds in some respects to modern interest.
It was condemned by St. Thomas.

He held that usury was sell-

ing something which did not exist--that is, charging for the
use of money--and therefore was contrary to justice which
required an exchange of equals.
Thus the present report is drawn to a conclusion.

Its

primary purpose was not so much to discuss in detail the
economics of St. Thomas as to present some of the principles
of the philosophy of life ot st. Thomas as the basis for his
economic considerations, and thus present a prolegomena to
his economics.

-44NOTES
1. Smith, Adam: M Enquiry ~ _1h!
Commonwealth .2£ Nations.

Nature.~

Causes

~.ill

2. Haney: History~ Economic Thougnt. This work traces the
history of economic thinking from the earliest times.
Because of the vast number of primary sources that
would have to be quoted if mention was made of specific
writers prior to Adam Smith this secondary source is
referred to.
3. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I. I, 2.
4. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, 3, c. 1
5. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I II 6, 1
6. Ibid., I II 13, 6
7. See note 10
8. st. Thomas Aquinas, summa Contra Gentiles, 3, c. 1
9. st. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I II 1
10. Ibid., I

II 1

11. Ibid., I

II 1, 4

12. Ibid., I

II

1, 4

13. Ibid., I

II

1, 5

14. Ibid., I

II

1, 5

15. Ibid., I

II

1, 5

16. Ibid., I

II

1

17. Ibid., I

II

2, 1

18. Ibid., I

II

2, 2

19. Ibid., I

II

2, 3

20. Ibid., I

II

2, 5

-4521. Ibid., I

II

2, 5

22. Ibid., I

II

2, 5

23. Ibid., I

II

3, 8

24. Ibid., I

II

3, 8

25. st. Thomas Aquinas:

.11! Besimine Principum, p. 30

26. Ibid., p. 30
27. Ibid., PP• 30-31
28. Ibid., p. 32
29. Ibid., pp. 32-33
30. st. Thomas Aquinas, summa Theolosica, I
31. st. Thomas Aquinas,

II

20, 1, 2

Q!• Resimine Principum, pp 106-7

32. Many references may be made to substantiate these
references. Particular attention is called to the
following:
Ashley,

Introduction
Vol. I

Lipson,

Economic His torr ..2.!. Ensland, 5th edit., Vol. I

Sombart,

~Modern

~

Economic History

~

Theorr,

Kapitalismus, I

33. st. Thomas Aquinas, summa Theolosica, I
34. Ibid., I

II

61, 2

35. Ibid., I

II

60, 4

36. Ibid., II II

58, 1

37. Ibid., II II

58, i, ad 3

38. Ibid., II II

58, 2

39. Ibid., II II

58, 4

40. Ibid., II II

58, 5

II 55 and 56

-4641. Ibid., II II

58, 5

42. Ibid., II II

58, 7

43. Ibid., II II

58, 7

44. Ibid., II II

58, 10

45. Ibid., II II

58, 12

46. Ibid., II II

58, 12

47. Ibid., II II

58, 12

Ibid., II II

61, 1

49. Ibid., II II

61, 2

50~

Ibid., II II

61, 2

51. Ibid., II II

61, 2

152, Ibid., II II

23, 1

53. Ibid., II II

23, 1

54. Ibid., II II

23, 1, ad 2 um

55. Ibid., II II

23, 6

56. Ibid., II II

25, 1

57. Ibid., II II

26, 1

58. Ibid., II II

26, 2

-48~

59, Deibler, Principles £!Economics, p. 13
60. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theo1ogica, II II
61. Ibid., II II

77, 1

62. Ibid., II II

77, 1

63. Ibid., II II

77, 1

64. Ibid., II II

77, 2

65. Ibid., II II

77, 2

77, l

-4766. Ibid., II II

77, 4

67. Ibid., II II 78, l
68. Ibid., II II

78, l

69. Ibid., II II

78, l

70. Ibid., II II

78, 2, ad l

71. Ibid., II II

78, 2, ad 5

-48-

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary sources
st. Thomas Aquinas:

Summa Theologica

In this work of st. Thomas we have practically a
complete statement of his philosophy. The work, the
longest work of st. Thomas, is divided into three
parts, with two parts to the second part. The first
part deals with God, the second part deals with man's
ascent to God, and the third part deals with Christ-the way to God.
St. Thomas Aquinas:

~Regimine

Principum

The translation of G. a. Phelan was used in the
report. The book was written by st. Thomas for the
King of Cyprus. It attempts to expound the teachings of Holy Scripture and philosophy on the meaning
and customs of good rulers, on the origin of
government and on the duties of those who govern.
It is largely theological although many philosophical
doctrines on the subJect of government are included.

Secondary sources
Gilson-Ward:

Moral Values

~ ~

Moral

~

This work is a translation of Gilson's book on
the ethics of st. Thomas. The original work of
Gilson followed closely the text of St. Thomas on
all subjects involved in his treatment of the moral
life. The translation is not literal and may at
times be misleading unless it is properly interpreted. The book is divided into two parts. The
first part deals with the Thomistic Theory of morals
and the second part deals with the moral life in
practise.
BOOKS CONSULTED
AShley:

Introduction to Economic History

~

Theory, Vol.

!

-49-

Haney:
sombart:
Smith:

History
~

~

Economic Thought

Modern Kapitalismus, I

An Enquiry into
Commonwealth~

Deibler:

.!!!!. Nature .!a£ Causes .2f .1!!.!
Nations.

Principles of Economics

The thesis "A Prolegomena to the Economics of St. Thomas
Aquinas 1 " written by William H. Conley 1 has been accepted
by the Graduate School with reference to form 1 and by
the readers whose names appear below, with reference to
content.

It is, therefore 1 accepted as a partial fulfillment

of the requirements of the degree conferred.
Rev. John McCormick,S.J.

April 2 1 1935

Rev. Joseph McLaughlin,S.J.

April 20,1935

Joseph Le Blanc,Ph.D.

April 20,1935

